This paper investigates whether the Standard & Poors (S&P) transparency and disclosure (T&D) rankings represented new information to the financial markets when the results of the study were released by S&P on October 15, 2002. The S&P T&D rankings report the relative levels of three disclosure dimensions (ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and management structure and process) provided by firms in their annual reports (annual report rankings) and complete regulatory filings (composite rankings). The results suggest that the S&P T&D rankings provided new information to the markets on cross-sectional differences in disclosure, and the market responds unfavorably during the event period to firms with large difference in disclosure levels across annual report and other regulatory filings. Further analyses reveal that the results are driven by the subcategory of ownership structure and investor rights.
Introduction and Synopsis
This paper examines whether the financial market responded to the October 15, 2002 The Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals were sensational not only to the business community but also to the public at large (see, e.g., Ip and Schroeder 2002) , and the continuous coverage led to calls for new legislation to establish new standards for corporate behavior and corporate governance and to impose penalties on offending firms and managers (Jain and Rezaee 2006) . Given the importance of corporate governance issues at the time, S&P chose to release publicly the rankings of corporate-governance related disclosures [ownership structure and investor rights (OW), financial transparency and information disclosure (FT), and board and management structure and process (BS)] for the S&P 500 firms. We conjecture that these rankings represented new information that differed from the market's assessment of the adequacy of firms' disclosure practices and that the market reacted to these rankings in a systematic fashion.
Two characteristics suggest that the T&D study's release could have triggered market responses. First, the study was conducted under the auspices of Standard & Poors, a highly respected financial services firm, and represented the first post-Enron, objective, publicly available assessment of the S&P 500 firms' disclosure practices as they related to corporate governance. Given the release date, the study's findings were thus very timely. Second, S&P's assessment of disclosure practices included not only rankings of conventional financial disclosures (something other studies had previously examined; see, e.g., Botosan 1997 ), but it also reported rankings of nonfinancial disclosures (i.e., OW and BS rankings), with emphasis on disclosures that S&P deemed relevant in evaluating governance practices. Just as interestingly, the S&P study reported much lower rankings for these nonfinancial subcategories and suggested that nonfinancial disclosure practice needed improvement. These two characteristics have implications for the nature of the market's response to the study's release. The timeliness of the release suggests that the market would likely respond to the announcement, but it does not necessarily imply that the report would be informative. However, the novelty of the study's focus on nonfinancial corporate governance-related disclosures, combined with S&P's call for improvements in these disclosures, enhanced the study's potential to revise analysts' and investors' assessments about the nature of firms' disclosure and corporate governance practices.
S&P released their study results as a way to highlight their own fee-for-service corporate governance scoring system (Patel and Dallas 2002) . The published results of the S&P T&D study report three components of information that we use to assess the potential of the rankings to inform market participants. First, the study provides rankings of the relative quantity of the disclosures contained in a given S&P 500 firm's annual report (annual report rankings). 1 Second, similar rankings are reported of disclosures contained in firm's required regulatory filings, which consist of 10-Ks and annual proxy statements (composite rankings). The difference between the two sets of rankings thus represents the difference in disclosure level between the two disclosure vehicles (differential rankings). Third, Patel and Dallas (the study's authors) developed the rankings structured around three dimensions of disclosure that S&P asserts are relevant in assessing firms' corporate governance mechanisms: financial transparency and information disclosure (FT), ownership structure and investors rights (OW) and board and management structure and process (BS). Since these three dimensions are deemed by S&P to be useful in evaluating governance mechanisms, our research empirically examines the information content of (1) the levels of the disclosure rankings, (2) the differences in disclosure rankings between annual reports and required regulatory filings, and (3) the levels and differences in the rankings for the three disclosure subcategories.
We examine risk-adjusted abnormal returns in order to shed light on the information content of ranking levels and differences between composite rankings and annual report rankings for the three disclosure dimensions. Specifically, for the U. S. firms included in S&P's study, we measure firms' risk-adjusted abnormal returns over the four-day window surrounding the October 15, 2002 release date of the T&D rankings. We regress these measures on cross-sectional models that include both the 1 S&P cautioned readers that sole reliance on their disclosure rankings was insufficient to properly evaluate firms' governance practices, since the rankings reflect disclosure quantity and do not directly measure disclosure quality. However, past studies have suggested that the disclosure quantity and quality are highly correlated (see, e.g., Durnev and Kim 2005, Botosan 1997, Botosan, Plumlee and Xie 2004). Our evidence on market responses to the S&P disclosure scores is not premised on the notion that higher scores indicate higher disclosure quality. We instead suggest that S&P objectivity as sponsor of the study enhanced the credibility of the rankings, and thus the rankings were uniquely positioned to influence investor assessments of disclosure quality. disclosure rankings and the difference in annual report and composite rankings (differential rankings) for the overall and the three dimensions of disclosure. We predict that higher disclosure rankings and lower differential rankings will be associated with more positive risk-adjusted returns.
We find that greater differential rankings are associated with more negative abnormal returns. Further investigation reveals that this association is driven primarily by the subcategory rankings of ownership structure and shareholder rights. This result is robust after controlling for the earnings announcements made during the event period. We conclude that the T&D rankings directed investors' attention to differences in firms' disclosure practices between annual reports and required regulatory filings. The negative reaction suggests that investors penalize firms that engage in this selective disclosure strategy. On the other hand, we generally fail to find an association between the composite rankings and the abnormal returns. This indicates that the market was aware of firms' disclosure levels in these composite filings.
The rest of our study is organized in the following manner. The next section briefly discusses the Patel and Dallas (2002) study, summarizes the relevant literature on disclosure quality and develops our research predictions. Section 3 describes the sample and variable measurements in our paper. Section 4 presents our main results and provides details on our sensitivity tests. Finally, Section 5 presents our concluding remarks. Standard & Poors developed their study of disclosure as part of an initiative to provide corporate governance information and analytical services to market participants; the study's methodology was developed from S&P's previous work in the area of corporate governance scoring (Patel and Dallas 2002) . The study involved measurement/assessment of 98 disclosure attributes that are divided into three basic subcategories: ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes), financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes), and board and management structure and process (35 attributes). Appendix 3 of the S&P T&D study provides a listing of each attribute under each category and subcategory (Patel and Dallas 2002) ; these are reproduced in our Appendix. These three subcategories represent domains of disclosure that S&P routinely assesses as part of their own corporate governance scoring process (Patel and Dallas 2002) . The measurement/assessment was limited to determining if a particular attribute was present or not; the study's authors specifically ruled out any attempts to assess the quality of the disclosed information. 2 The published rankings reflect decile ordering for the cross-section of S&P 500 firms, with the overall rankings reflecting the ratio of the number of attributes present to the total number of attributes. Higher ranks therefore reflect the fact that a greater quantity of attributes is present in the disclosure vehicle. Note that the presence or absence of the disclosure attributes was measured for (1) the annual report to the shareholders and (2) the required 10-K and proxy statement regulatory filings. As a result, both annual report rankings and composite rankings are presented by Patel and Dallas. "Final rankings" reflect an aggregate ranking for all 98 attributes, while "sub-rankings" are reported for each of the three disclosure subcategories. Since the annual report is typically a subset or part of the information provided in the required regulatory filings, then, by construction, the composite ranking should be greater than or equal to the annual report ranking.
Interestingly, Patel and Dallas (2002, p. 3) document a "notable difference between the T&D rankings based on annual reports alone and [the] T&D rankings on a composite basis." Specifically, they find that composite ranking levels were consistently high, while annual report rankings were much more variable. Note that various researchers have concluded that the annual report is the "major reporting document" for analysts (Knutson 1992, 7) and is "one of the most important sources of corporate information" (Botosan 1997, 331) . But the observed differences between composite rankings and annual report rankings could imply that a degree of information asymmetry exists between investors, who may focus on the annual report for information disclosures, and managers, who may provide relatively greater information disclosures in the required regulatory filings rather than the annual report (Patel and Dallas 2002; Ely and Stanny 1999) . The degree to which observed differences in disclosure between the two vehicles affect shareholder wealth could therefore inform standard setters and regulators of any potential need to improve the consistency of disclosure, and may provide guidance to the firm in setting its optimal disclosure policy.
The Capital Market Effects of Disclosure Rankings
Lowenstein (1996; p. 1335-6) argues that "good disclosure has been a most efficient and effective mechanism for inducing managers to manage better."
The literature on the effects of corporate disclosure tells a fairly consistent story (see Healy and Palepu 2001 for a comprehensive review of this literature; see Core 2001 for a discussion of this review). Recent research suggests a positive association between increased disclosure and positive capital market effects (e.g., Botosan 1997). Specifically, firms' increased disclosures reduce the information asymmetry between managers and investors and thus reduce firms' cost of equity capital (see, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Verrecchia 1994, Botosan 1997) . Regarding the S&P T&D rankings specifically, Cheng, Collins and Huang (2006) document that higher financial transparency and information disclosure rankings are associated with lower costs of equity capital, especially when high disclosure occurs in strong shareholder rights environments. However, it is unclear from their study whether the actual release of the rankings was regarded as an "information event" in the sense that the information informed the markets, and that investors were able to interpret and impound the rankings quickly in share prices.
Our study focuses on both the level of the disclosure rankings and the differences between composite rankings and annual report rankings at both the overall and subcategory levels. Interpretation of the level of disclosure ranking seems straight-forward; everything else being equal, a higher (lower) rank implies a higher (lower) level of disclosure, regardless of disclosure vehicle. Release of the composite rankings may or may not reflect new information to the markets. If investors are already aware of the relative disclosure levels, then any reaction would likely be small. However, given the climate of investor suspicion and distrust of managers' communications with the investing public during the release period, investors may react to lower composite ranking levels by bidding shares down (i.e., a negative reaction).
On the other hand, there is relatively little research focusing on disclosure differences between these two disclosure vehicles, although the Patel and Dallas study clearly documents evidence of these differences. Clearly, the annual report is generally considered to be part of the annual 10-K filings, while annual proxy statements are filed in advance of meetings of shareholders. There is some research that the 10-K filings have incremental information when filing format is considered (Qi, Wu and Haw 2000), but there is relatively little research examining the information content of 10-K/proxy statements over the annual report to shareholders. Ely and Stanny (1999) find that firms with lower analyst following are more likely to be less specific in their environmental disclosures in their annual reports than in their 10-Ks and are penalized less for their environmental disclosures than those whose disclosures are consistent.
This suggests that information asymmetry may exist between annual report users and 10-K users, and managers could take advantage of this information asymmetry by adopting a differential disclosure strategy in annual reports and 10-Ks/proxy statements. In other words, instead of presenting relevant information in the annual report, managers may intentionally choose to disclose this information deep in the body of the 10-K/proxy statements. To the extent that information gathering is costly for investors, such a strategy could give rise to information asymmetry and impose additional costs on investors. 3 Again, given the climate of investor suspicion and distrust of managers' communications with the investing public prevelant during the event period, this suggests that larger differences between annual report rankings and composite rankings will be unfavorable viewed by the markets.
Given that our research focus is on the capital market/shareholder wealth effects, we focus on the risk-adjusted abnormal returns during our event period for the 459 firms in our sample and the associations between returns and the various composite and differential disclosure rankings. Our above discussion leads us to expect that high disclosure ranking levels will be viewed favorably by the market while large differences between composite rankings and annual report rankings will be viewed negatively. By extension, we predict a positive (negative) association between disclosure rankings (differential rankings) and risk-adjusted abnormal returns.
Sample and Variable Measurement

Sample and Descriptive Statistics on T&D Rankings
Our sample in this study consists of 459 firms that were ranked in the S&P T&D ranking study. Patel and Dallas reported in their Appendix 4 the ranks for a total of 460 firms out of the S&P 500 firms. 4 We excluded one of these firms from our study due to missing data; this left a total of 459 firms for our analyses. Summary statistics on the ranks for these 459 firms are reported in Panel A of our Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 here 3 Patel and Dallas (2002) note that the Conference Board's Commission on Public Trust and Private Information suggests that corporate disclosures should be more userfriendly. They also quote President George W. Bush's challenge to businesses to disclose details on CEO compensation in their annual reports. 4 Patel and Dallas examined the companies that were members of the S&P 500 index both on June 30, 2002 and on September 30, 2002. Their study excludes 40 firms for which there may be some regulatory inquiries relating to their public filings or for which they had incomplete information as of June 30, 2002. For the final aggregate rankings (i.e., FR), the mean (median) composite ranking (FRC) for the 459 firms is 7.50 (8.0), while the mean (median) annual report ranking (FRA) is 4.66 (5). The mean (median) differential ranking (FRD) is 2.84 (3.0). The minimum (maximum) composite rank is 6 (9), the minimum (maximum) annual report rank is 1(8) while the minimum (maximum) differential ranking is 0 (6) .
With respect to the rankings of the subcategories, we find relatively high mean/median scores for the financial transparency and information disclosures (FTC and FTA, respectively, for the composite and annual report rankings), and relatively small differences (FTD) between composite and annual report rankings. However, FTD has the highest standard deviation among all measures of the differential rankings. Focusing on ownership structure/investor rights (OWC and OWA, respectively, for the composite and annual report rankings) and board/management structure rankings (BSC and BSA, respectively, for the composite and annual report rankings), we find relatively lower mean/median scores for both, and relatively larger differential rankings (OWD and BSD, respectively, for the two categories). These statistics confirm the findings of Patel and Dallas (2002) that there is relatively low disclosure of ownership structure/investor rights and board structure/process in the annual reports and high variation in the financial transparency and information disclosures as contained in the annual reports.
Variable Measurement and Descriptive Statistics on Firm Characteristics and Market Metrics
We define our event window surrounding the 9:00 am, October 15, 2002 , release of the T&D study as the four-day period from October 14 through October 17. 5 Over this window, we collect the daily stock price and the S&P 500 index value from CRSP. S&P 500 industry classifications are obtained from Standard & Poors. All other data are obtained from COMPUSTAT.
In order to compute returns, we use the stock price adjusted for dividends and stock splits. We compute the risk-adjusted abnormal return in the following manner. 6 The raw return for firm i is measured as the difference in adjusted stock price of the end of the period in question and the beginning of 5 We suspect that some market participants may have already learned about the results of the report before October 15. Since October 14 is a Monday, we extend the window to only one day prior to the announcement date. 6 We examine risk-adjusted returns in part because Patel and Dallas (2002) document a negative association between market beta and disclosure ranking, implying that greater disclosure is associated with lower risk. Table 2 reports the regression results for models ABN1, ABN2 and ABN3.
Insert Table 2 here
If the market perceives cross-sectional differences in TD rankings as conveying new information on firms' disclosure practices, then we should observe a positive association between the disclosure rankings and risk-adjusted returns and a negative association between the differential rankings and risk-adjusted returns. Panel A of Table 2 reports the association between risk-adjusted returns and the overall final rankings (FR) and the ownership structure rankings (OW). Model ABN1 with FRA as the only independent variable indicates that FRA has a significant positive effect on abnormal returns, while model ABN1 with FRD as the only independent variable indicates that FRD has a significant negative effect.
Model ABN1 with FRC as the only independent variable does not report a significant coefficient of FRC. These findings suggest that the market returns are associated with the FRA and FRD. However, FRA and FRD are highly correlated as FRC = FRA + FRD. When FRC is fixed, an increase in FRA results in a decrease in FRD. In Model ABN2, we directly test the effect of FRD on the abnormal returns after controlling for FRC. A significantly negative coefficient on FRD in the model ABN2 will indicate that, for firms with the same FRC, a higher FRD (higher FRA) is associated with lower (higher) abnormal returns. The results of the ABN2 model indeed show a significantly negative FRD, which is consistent with the results of the ABN1 model in that a higher FRD (higher FRA) is associated with lower (higher) abnormal returns. FRC continues to be insignificant in the ABN2 model. Moreover, Model ABN1 with FRD as the independent variable has reports an adjusted R-square (at 0.83%) that is higher than the model ABN2 (0.63%). This indicates that FRC does not have additional explanatory power relative to FRD for explaining variations in riskadjusted returns. These findings suggest that the market is concerned mainly about the differential rankings and responds negatively to differences between annual and composite rankings.
Panel A in Table 2 also shows that both OWA and OWD have significant coefficients in Model ABN1, while only OWD has a significant coefficient in Model ABN2 (one-tailed p = 0.005). We interpret the results dealing with OWC and OWD jointly as evidence that the abnormal returns are associated with differences in disclosure rankings between the annual report and the composite reports. Further, these associations are stronger than those for the FR variables. Panel B in Table 2 reports the associations between risk-adjusted returns and the remaining two subcategories of FT and BS rankings, respectively. Panel B reports one-tailed significance for FTD across both ABN1 and ABN2 models, with both at the p < 0.05 level. We find similar, though weaker, results for the BSD variables (one-tailed p = 0.065 in Model ABN1 and one-tailed p = 0.056 in Model ABN2).
Panel C reports our results for Model ABN3, which includes all three subcategories of rankings. After including all rankings in the three subcategories, we find that OWC is very weakly positively related to abnormal returns (one-tailed p = 0.099), while OWD is significantly negative (one-tailed p = 0.032), thus suggesting that OWD is the driving force for the association between FRD and the abnormal returns documented in Panel A.
Controlling for the Earnings Announcements during the Event Period
With respect to earnings announcements, a total of 144 firms announced earnings during our event window of October 14 to October 18. Previous research has suggested that a link exists between disclosure and earnings response coefficients. For example, Gelb and Zarowin (2000) document a positive association between disclosure level and earnings quality. To control for the interaction between disclosure and earnings response coefficients, we interact earnings forecast errors (FE) with 0/1 dummy variables to indicate low and high rankings of TDA and TDD (where TD represents a particular disclosure ranking).
To maintain the additive feature of TDC = TDA + TDD, we add the dummy measures of TDA and TDD to derive the dummy measure of TDC. Thus, in similar fashion,
,  BSC and  BSD each measure the change in ERC when the level of the composite rankings or the differential rankings is high for the respective subcategory. Given these specifications, we use the following regression models to examine whether the results in the Table 2 are valid after controlling for the coinciding earnings announcements:
where: The ERC2 model thus incorporates controls for earnings announcements for the previously estimated ABN2 models, while the ERC3 model does the same for the ABN3 models. Though the coefficients on these interaction terms can inform us the effects of disclosures rankings on the ERC, our main purpose here is to test whether the coefficients on TDC (TDD) continue to be positively (negatively) related to the abnormal returns after controlling for the earnings announcement. Table 3 reports the estimation results for these models.
Insert Table 3 here By comparing the results from Table 3 with those  from Table 2 , we can evaluate the effects of adding FE variables to the respective ABN2 and ABN3 models. The adjusted R-squared statistics have changed from 0.63% to 2.55% for FR, from 1.05% to 1.07% for OW, from 0.30% to 1.09% for FT, from 0.14% to 0.56% for BS and from 0.58% to 6.75% for the combined model (i.e., from ABN3 to ERC3). These results imply that the earnings announcements have significant explanatory power for abnormal returns that are incremental to the release of the disclosure rankings. Table 3 reports results that are very similar to those in Table 2 . When the overall level of disclosure is examined (the first column of results), we find the coefficient on FRD to be significantly negative (two-tailed p = 0.027). In the second column of results, OWD has a significantly negative effect (two-tailed p = 0.010). The third column documents a significantly negative coefficient on FTD (two-tailed p = 0.079), while the fourth column reports a negative coefficient on BSD that is significant only using a one-tailed test (two-tailed p = 0.142). In the ERC3 model with all the sub-rankings included, we find OWD to be the only significant disclosure variable (p = 0.024). In summary, this section reports the results of our tests controlling for the effect of earnings announcements on the abnormal returns. We continue to find that FRD is negatively related to the abnormal returns and OWD is the subcategory that driving the relation.
Robustness Tests
ERC Analyses Only for Firms with Earnings Announcements
We rerun our ERC models by deleting firms without earnings announcements. This leaves us with a total 250 of 142 firms during the 4-day event window (two firms out of 144 announcing earnings were excluded due to unavailability of forecast errors).
The untabulated results document a model adjusted R 2 of 13.66%, higher than when the whole sample was analyzed. Our general conclusion reported in the previous section remains unchanged.
Controls for Industry, Beta and Size Differences
We add industry dummies to all the models to test if the omitted industry variables have any effect on our conclusion. For the ABN and ERC models, adding industry dummies does not change our general conclusions. Previous research also shows that ERCs are affected by firm characteristics such as risk and size. When we add interactive variables of market beta, size and FE in the ERC3 model, our results are similar to previously reported.
Use of Different Return Metrics
We use different return metrics including raw returns, market-adjusted return and industry-adjusted return metrics for the ERC models. Since these returns are not risk adjusted, the coefficients of FT variables and of BS variables behave as though the return metric has not been adjusted for risk. However, the results reported in Section 4.2 remain qualitatively unchanged.
Discussions and Conclusion
Accounting frauds, like Enron's and Worldcom's, have resulted in corporate governance being one of the more widely discussed issues in the financial press. In addition to the frauds perpetrated on the investing public, belated disclosures of failed business ventures and reports of excessive executive compensation have dominated much of the public and political discourse and have prompted calls for greater mandated disclosures. The S&P T&D study develops a model of disclosures structured around three dimensions of disclosure: ownership structure and investor rights (OW), financial transparency and information disclosures (FT) and board and management structure and process (BS).
Their research results include rankings of the disclosure quantities for three subcategories and a compiled final ranking for both the annual reports (-A) and the required regulatory filings (-C).
We evaluate whether the release of the disclosure rankings provided new information to the financial markets. Our empirical analysis focuses on the association between the relative disclosure rankings of these three disclosure dimensions and risk-adjusted abnormal returns in the period surrounding the announcement date of the S&P's report. Previous research studies (e.g., Patel and Dallas, 2002 , Botosan and Plumlee, 2002 , Gelb and Zarowin, 2000 report that higher levels of financial disclosure are associated with reduced firm risk, increased liquidity, higher prices, and higher ERCs. These studies link managers' disclosure decisions to changes in stockholders' wealth through various market mechanisms. Our study of the S&P T&D rankings allows us to extend this research stream to include corporate governance-related disclosures as well.
Based on the two notions that higher disclosure improves liquidity which leads to higher prices and that the post-Enron market favors firms with more transparent disclosure practices, we predict that, when the S&P T&D rankings were made public, they represented new information, and the market would respond to this new information favorably for firms with greater disclosure. This leads us to evaluate the effects of the rankings on the risk-adjusted abnormal return surrounding the announcement date. We hypothesize that the abnormal return will be positively related to the composite rankings and negatively related to the differential rankings. A larger difference in disclosure quantity between the 10-Ks/proxy statements and annual reports would be consistent with managers engaging in a selective disclosure strategy between disclosure vehicles.
Our regression results indicate that the market responds negatively to firms that have larger differences between the annual report rankings and composite rankings. On the other hand, we generally do not find significant associations between the composite rankings and abnormal returns. These results indicate that the composite rankings did not bring new information to the market while the differences between the composite rankings and the annual rankings revealed new information to the market. This may also due to the fact that the highprofile release of the rankings directed the public attention to the differential levels of disclosure by identifying firms that were not disclosing adequately in the annual reports (see Patel and Dallas 2002) . The notion of selective disclosure in the prominent annual report appears to have been viewed by the market as an indication of poor disclosure practice, thus resulting in the negative market reaction.
We also find the subcategory of ownership structure and investor rights to be the driving force behind the observed abnormal returns. This might be the case that the other two categories, financial disclosure and information disclosure and board and management structure and process, had been more closely studied by the market; therefore, the market was aware of the differences between annual and composite reports for these two categories. This might also have been caused by the fact that the disclosure items in the subcategory of ownership structure and investor rights are more difficult to identify and assess; as a result, the T& D rankings are able to provide new quantitative information to the market with regard to firms' disclosures in this subcategory. States Table 1 : There are a total of 459 firms that have all data available. A total of 460 firms in S&P 500 were ranked. The reported ranks range from 1 to 10. FR denotes the final ranking for all subcategories combined, and OW, FT, and BS denote the subcategories of ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and management structure and process, respectively. The suffixes -C, -A, and -D denote composite, annual report, and difference, respectively. FRC represents the composite final rankings based on annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements together. FRA represents the final rankings based on the annual report only. The differential "final ranking" is defined as FRD = FRC -FRA. Similarly, OWC is the sub-ranking for ownership structure and investor rights based on the annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements together; OWA is the subcategory ranking based on the annual report only; and OWD = OWC -OWA. The other subcategory rankings (FTC, FTA, FTD, BSC, BSA and BSD are measured in a similar fashion. The risk-adjusted returns are calculated over the 4-day event period surrounding the announcement of S&P's T&D scores (i.e., Oct. [14] [15] [16] [17] 2002) . FE is the forecast error. There are a total of 251 firms that made earnings announcements during the period from Oct. 8 to Oct. 23 with 144 announcements issued during our event period (October 14-17), 15 announcements in the four days prior to our event period, and 92 announcements in the four days after our event period. However, due to zero estimated earnings, four observations are dropped. Notes: The number of observations is 459. The numbers in parentheses represent either the two-tailed significance levels (for the intercepts) or the one-tailed significance levels (for the coefficients on the disclosure variables). Boldface indicates significance at p < 0.10. Abni is the beta-adjusted abnormal return for firm i during our four-event-day window (see the variables section for details). TDX = S&P's T&D composite and annual report rankings and their differences. TD = FR, OW, FT or BS. FR denotes the final ranking for all subcategories combined, and OW, FT and BS denote the subcategories of ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and management structure and process, respectively. X = suffixes A, C and D, and these suffixes denote composite rankings, annual report rankings, and differences in rankings, respectively. Notes: Number of observation is 459. The numbers in parentheses represent the two-tailed significance levels. Boldface indicates significance at p < 0.10. FEi is the forecast error for firm i if the firm made an earning announcement during the 4 event days, otherwise, FEi equals 0. There are a total of 144 firms that made earnings announcements in the 4 event days. DTDDi = 1 if TDDi has a rank higher than the median, zero otherwise; DTDAi =1 if TDAi (i.e., the TD rank from the annual report) has a rank higher then the median, zero otherwise; and DTDC =DTDA + DTDD.
